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CUSTODY
JURISDICTION by CATHERINE
HOLLAND PETERSEN Source: http://www.aaml.org/Articles/2001-03/Peterson-Custody.htm The
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (U.C.C.J.A.) was written thirty years
ago. During the ensuing years,
conflicts in interpretation prompted the adoption of the Parental Kidnapping
Prevention Act (P.K.P.A.) by Congress (28 U.S.C. § 1738) and the creation of
the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (U.C.C.J.E.A.)
by the National Commission on Uniform State Laws.
The U.C.C.J.E.A. was written as a replacement for the U.C.C.J.A. in
order to harmonize the provisions of the U.C.C.J.A. and the P.K.P.A. as well
as other federal statutes such as the Violence against Women Act (18 U.S.C. §
2265). The U.C.C.J.E.A. has now
been adopted by Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Minnesota, Montana, North Carolina,
North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, and West Virginia.
It will be considered this year in the District of Columbia, Indiana,
Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey, and Virginia. HOME
STATE PRIORITY.
If
the parties to the initial custody dispute live in different jurisdictions,
the first step is to check the custody statute adopted by the two states in
question. Under the U.C.C.J.A.,
which was adopted by all fifty states in one form or another, home state
jurisdiction is no more significant than any other jurisdictional basis,
unless the state changed the model act to give home state jurisdiction
dominance. On the other hand, the provisions of the U.C.C.J.E.A. mandate
that home state jurisdiction be given priority in Section 201.
SECTION
201. INITIAL CHILD-CUSTODY
JURISDICTION. (a)
Except as otherwise provided in Section 204, a court of this State has
jurisdiction to make an initial child-custody determination only if: (1)
this State is the home State of the child on the date of the
commencement of the proceeding, or was the home State of the child within six
(6) months before the
commencement of the proceeding and the child is absent from this State but a
parent or person acting as a parent continues to live in this State; (2)
a court of another State does not have jurisdiction under paragraph
(1), or a court of the home State of the child has declined to exercise
jurisdiction on the ground that this State is the more appropriate forum under
Section 207 or 208; and, (A)
the child and the child’s parents, or the child and at least one (1)
parent or a person acting as a parent, have a significant connection with this
State other than mere physical presence; and, (B)
substantial evidence is available in this State concerning the
child’s care, protection, training, and personal relationships; (3)
all courts having jurisdiction under paragraph (1) or (2) have declined
to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that a court of this State is the more
appropriate forum to the custody of the child under Section 207 or 208; or, (4)
no court of any other State would have jurisdiction under the criteria
specified in paragraph (1), (2), or (3). (b)
Subsection (a) is the exclusive jurisdictional basis for making a
child-custody determination by a court of this State. (c)
Physical presence of, or personal jurisdiction over, a party or a child
is not necessary or sufficient. Consequently,
in the initial dispute conceivably both states could claim jurisdiction under
state law, one as the home state, the other as a significant connection state. The
P.K.P.A. does not have a specific provision which will function as a tie
breaker in that situation. It
does not dictate which state can take initial jurisdiction, rather it provides
for full faith and credit once a custody order has been entered. It requires enforcement of the initial custody order only when
the custody determination is made by the home state. Other state custody determinations are not entitled to such
recognition unless there is no home state.
Consequently, when it comes time to enforce the two orders the one
issued by the home state will be the one entitled to full faith and credit.
That can provide a forceful argument in favor of the home state order. The
U.C.C.J.A., however, provides that custody determinations are entitled to
enforcement even if they would be denied enforcement under the P.K.P.A.
Therefore within the borders of the significant jurisdiction state, its
order would be valid under its law even though enforcement in the other
jurisdiction or a third state would fail. EMERGENCY
JURISDICTION.
In addition to home state and
significant connections jurisdiction, both the U.C.C.J.A. and the U.C.C.J.E.A.
allow the assumption of jurisdiction based on an emergency. Unfortunately, the case law under the U.C.C.J.A. has varying
interpretations of emergency jurisdiction which have created problems.
Some states governed by the U.C.C.J.A. consider emergency jurisdiction
a basis for a temporary order only until such time as the case can be
considered in the proper jurisdiction. Other U.C.C.J.A. states impose no limit
on the emergency jurisdiction, considering it on par with home state
jurisdiction. The different
interpretations create the potential for conflicting custody determinations
considered valid in the respective states.
If the two states in question both have adopted the U.C.C.J.E.A. then
the problem is reduced. The U.C.C.J.E.A. mandates
that emergency jurisdiction is temporary only.
If one state is governed by the U.C.C.J..A. and the other by the
U.C.C.J.E.A. it is again possible that there will be two different orders
issued which are considered valid under the different state laws. The P.K.P.A. will only mandate enforcement of an emergency
order until such time as the home state can assume jurisdiction.
This is in harmony with the U.C.C.J.E.A..
There is no problem until the emergency order issued by the U.C.C.J.A.
state is expected to yield to a home state order subsequently issued by the
U.C.C.J.E.A. state. The same
quandary could exist. Under the
individual state laws, each order would be considered valid, but under the
P.K.P.A., the U.C.C.J.A. emergency order would only be enforceable until the
home state order was issued. Within
the borders of the U.C.C.J.A. state, however, that would not carry any weight
because the full faith and credit provisions of the law only apply to
interstate controversies. EXCLUSIVE
CONTINUING JURISDICTION.
After the entry of an initial custody order, modification of that order
is controlled by the P.K.P.A. Other
states shall enforce and shall not modify the initial order unless the issuing
state has lost or relinquished jurisdiction.
The U.C.C.J.A. does not clearly state that the decree granting state
has exclusive continuing jurisdiction to modify its own decree.
The result is that there have been conflicting custody decrees, based
in one state on continuing jurisdiction and in the other on significant
contacts. Other problems have
resulted from a difference in treatment between a visitation order and a
custody order. These distinctions
have produced simultaneous proceedings and conflicting custody orders. Another
problem with continuing jurisdiction has been the lack of clarity in
determining when a state with continuing jurisdiction has relinquished it.
As a consequence, one court could determine that a prior state had
relinquished jurisdiction when, in fact, the prior court did not consider
itself to have relinquished its jurisdiction.
Due process concerns have also been raised as a result of
the informality of the contact between the courts without notice or
opportunity for the parties to be heard. SECTION
202. EXCLUSIVE, CONTINUING
JURISDICTION. (a)
Except as otherwise provided in Section 204, a court of this State
which has made a child-custody determination consistent with Section 201 or
203 has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over the determination until: (1)
a court of this State determines that neither the child, the child and
one parent, nor the child and a person acting as parent have a significant
connection with this State and that substantial evidence is no longer
available in this State concerning the child’s care, protection, training,
and personal relationships; or, (2)
a court of this State or a court of another State determines that the
child, the child’s parents, and any person acting as a parent do not
presently reside in this State. (b)
A court of this State which has made a child-custody determination and
does not have exclusive, continuing jurisdiction under this section may modify
that determination only if it has jurisdiction to make an initial
determination under Section 201. SECTION
206. SIMULTANEOUS PROCEEDINGS. (a)
Except as otherwise provided in Section 204, a court of this State may
not exercise its jurisdiction under this [article] if, at the time of the
commencement of the proceeding, a proceeding concerning the custody of the
child has been commenced in a court of another State having jurisdiction
substantially in conformity with this [Act], unless the proceeding has been
terminated or is stayed by the court of the other State because a court of
this State is a more convenient forum under Section 207. (b)
Except as otherwise provided in Section 204, a court of this State,
before hearing a child-custody proceeding, shall examine the court documents
and other information supplied by the parties pursuant to Section 209.
If the court determines that a child-custody proceeding has been
commenced in a court in another State having jurisdiction substantially in
accordance with this [Act], the court of this State shall stay its proceeding
and communicate with the court of the other State.
If the court of the State having jurisdiction substantially in
accordance with this [Act] does not determine that the court of this State is
a more appropriate forum, the court of this State shall dismiss the
proceeding. (c)
In a proceeding to modify a child-custody determination, a court of
this State shall determine whether a proceeding to enforce the determination
has been commenced in another State.
If a proceeding to enforce a child-custody determination has been
commenced in another State, the court may: (1)
stay the proceeding for modification pending the entry of an order of a
court of the other State enforcing, staying, denying, or dismissing the
proceeding for enforcement; (2)
enjoin the parties from continuing with the proceeding for enforcement;
or, (3)
proceed with the modification under conditions it considers
appropriate. SECTION
110. COMMUNICATION BETWEEN
COURTS. (a)
A court of this State may communicate with a court in another State
concerning a proceeding arising under this [Act]. (b)
The court may allow the parties to participate in the communication.
If the parties are not able to participate in the communication, they
must be given the opportunity to present facts and legal arguments before a
decision on jurisdiction is made. (c)
Communication between courts on schedules, calendars, court records,
and similar matters may occur without informing the parties.
A record need not be made of the communication. (d)
Except as otherwise provided in subsection (c), a record must be made
of a communication under this section. The
parties must be informed promptly of the communication and granted access to
the record. (e)
For the purposes of this section, “record” means information that
is inscribed on a tangible medium or that is stored in an electronic or other
medium and is retrievable in perceivable form. CLARIFICATION
OF “CUSTODY PROCEEDINGS”.
Does
the U.C.C.J.A. apply to neglect, abuse, dependency, wardship, guardianship,
termination of parental rights, adoption and protection from domestic violence
proceedings? Unfortunately, there
have not been uniform interpretations of this question. L.G. v. People, 890 P.2d 647 (Colo. 1995) (juvenile
neglect proceedings are not “custody proceedings” under the P.K.P.A.).
The U.C.C.J.E.A. clearly answers the question.
Section 102(4) states:
“Child-custody
proceeding” means a proceeding in which legal custody, physical custody, or
visitation with respect to a child is an issue. The term includes a proceeding for divorce, separation,
neglect, abuse, dependency, guardianship, paternity, termination of parental
rights, and protection from domestic violence, in which the issue may appear.
The term does not include a proceeding involving juvenile delinquency,
contractual emancipation, or enforcement under [Article] 3. BEST
INTERESTS.
Because litigants and courts have been tempted to invoke the “best
interests” language of the U.C.C.J.A. to legitimize what would otherwise be
an inappropriate exercise of jurisdiction, the U.C.C.J.E.A. eliminates the
term “best interests” in the jurisdictional considerations of a custody
case. The term is now left for
the substantive phase of the dispute. ENFORCEMENT
OF CUSTODY DETERMINATIONS.
The most radical change in the U.C.C.J.E.A. from the U.C.C.J.A. is the
inclusion of a uniform procedure for enforcement of custody and visitation
orders. The American Bar
Association Center on Children and the Law produced a study called Obstacles
to the Recovery and Return of Parentally Abducted Children.
The Obstacles Study documented that one of the major problems in
custody matters today is the absence in both the U.C.C.J.A. and
P.K.P.A. of any uniform mechanism for enforcing the custody
determinations which both mandated were to be enforced.
The U.C.C.J.E.A. takes the position that if custody or visitation
orders cannot be rapidly enforced then it is tantamount to a loss of custody
or visitation or a de facto modification of a custody determination.
It is equally important within the construct of the U.C.C.J.E.A. not to
modify a custody determination in an effort to enforce it. Article three (3) of the U.C.C.J.E.A. addresses this. In
a nutshell, if immediate enforcement of a visitation order, for example, is
sought in Forum B, the petitioner must register the order of Forum A with the
enforcement body (which may be a court or administrative agency at the
election of the state) of Forum B (Section 304).
The registration must contain specific information and if immediate
enforcement is sought, a specific request for enforcement of the custody or
visitation order must be included in conformity with Section 308.
The intent of Section 308 is to use the speed of a Habeas Corpus
proceeding in a uniform proceeding without transforming the enforcement forum
into a modification forum. It
is no defense to the expedited proceeding to pursue a substantive discussion
of the “best interests” of the child.
Such a discussion is specifically reserved for the forum with exclusive
continuing jurisdiction to modify its order, or to the proper modification
forum under Section 203. If the
petitioner is entitled to physical custody of the child under a valid order,
the order will be enforced. SECTION
304. TEMPORARY VISITATION. (a)
A court of this State which does not have jurisdiction to modify a
child-custody determination, may issue a temporary order enforcing: (1)
a visitation schedule made by a court of another State; or, (2)
the visitation provisions of a child-custody determination of another
State that does not provide for a specific visitation schedule. (b)
If a court of this State makes an order under subsection (a)(2), it
shall specify in the order a period that it considers adequate to allow the
petitioner to obtain an order from a court having jurisdiction under the
criteria specified in [Article] 2. The
order remains in effect until an order is obtained from the other court or the
period expires. The
intent of this section is to make it clear that a temporary remedy to a
visitation or custody denial is not intended as a permanent change in the
order. SECTION
307. SIMULTANEOUS PROCEEDINGS. If a proceeding for enforcement under
this [article] is commenced in a court of this State and the court determines
that a proceeding to modify the determination is pending in a court of another
State having jurisdiction to modify the determination under [Article] 2, the
enforcing court shall immediately communicate with the modifying court.
The proceeding for enforcement continues unless the enforcing court,
after consultation with the modifying court, stays or dismisses the
proceeding. SECTION
308. EXPEDITED ENFORCEMENT
OF CHILD-CUSTODY DETERMINATION. (a)
A petition under this [article] must be verified.
Certified copies of all orders sought to be enforced and of any order
confirming registration must be attached to the petition.
A copy of a certified copy of an order may be attached instead of the
original. (b)
A petition for enforcement of a child-custody determination must state: (1)
whether the court that
issued the determination identified the jurisdictional basis it relied upon in
exercising jurisdiction and, if so, what the basis was; (2)
whether the determination for which enforcement is sought has been
vacated, stayed, or modified by a court whose decision must be enforced under
this [Act] and, if so, identify the court, the case number, and the nature of
the proceeding; (3)
whether any proceeding has been commenced that could affect the current
proceeding, including proceedings relating to domestic violence, protective
orders, termination of parental rights, and adoptions and, if so, identify the
court, the case number, and the nature of the proceeding; (4)
the present physical address of the child and the respondent, if known; (5)
whether relief in addition to the immediate physical custody of the
child and attorney’s fees is sought, including a request for assistance from
[law enforcement officials], and, if so, the relief sought; and (6)
if the child-custody determination has been registered and confirmed
under Section 305, the date and place of registration. (c)
Upon the filing of a petition, the court shall issue an order directing
the respondent to appear in person with or without the child at a hearing and
may enter any order necessary to ensure the safety of the parties and the
child. The hearing must be held
on the judicial day after service of the order unless that date is impossible.
In that event, the court shall hold the hearing on the first judicial
day possible. The court may
extend the date of hearing at the request of the petitioner. (d)
An order issued under subsection (c) must state the time and place of
the hearing and advise the respondent that at the hearing the court will order
that the petitioner may take immediate physical custody of the child and the
payment of fees, costs, and expenses under Section 312, and may schedule a
hearing to determine whether further relief is appropriate, unless the
respondent appears and establishes that: (1)
the child-custody determination has not been registered and confirmed
under Section 305, and that: (A)
the issuing court did not have jurisdiction under [Article] 2; (B)
the child-custody determination for which enforcement is sought has
been vacated, stayed or modified by a court having jurisdiction to do so under
[Article] 2; (C)
the respondent was entitled to notice, but notice was not given in
accordance with the standards of Section 108, in the proceedings before the
court that issued the order for which enforcement is sought; or, (2)
the child-custody determination for which enforcement is sought was
registered and confirmed under Section 304, but has been vacated, stayed, or
modified by a court of a State having jurisdiction to do so under [Article] 2. SECTION
310. HEARING AND ORDER. (a)
Unless the court issues a temporary emergency order pursuant to Section
204, upon a finding that a petitioner is entitled to immediate physical
custody of the child, the court shall order that the petitioner may take
immediate physical custody of the child unless the respondent establishes
that: (1)
the child-custody determination has not been registered and confirmed
under Section 305 and that: (A)
the issuing court did not have jurisdiction under [Article] 2; (B)
the child-custody determination for which enforcement is sought has
been vacated, stayed, or modified by a court of a State having jurisdiction to
do so under [Article] 2; or, (C)
the respondent was entitled to notice, but notice was not given in
accordance with the standards of Section 108, in the proceedings before the
court that issued the order for which enforcement is sought; or, (2)
the child-custody determination for which enforcement is sought was
registered and confirmed under Section 305, but has been vacated, stayed, or
modified by a court of a state having jurisdiction to do so under [Article] 2. (b)
The court shall award the fees, costs, and expenses authorized under
Section 312 and may grant additional relief, including a request for the
assistance of [law enforcement officials], and set a further hearing to
determine whether additional relief is appropriate. (c)
If a party called to testify refuses to answer on the ground that the
testimony may be self-incriminating, the court may draw an adverse inference
from the refusal. (d)
A privilege against disclosure of communications between spouses and a
defense of immunity based on the relationship of husband and wife or parent
and child may not be invoked in a proceeding under this [article]. Another
unique suggestion of the U.C.C.J.E.A. is the warrant directed to law
enforcement to assist in the enforcement of a custody order.
While a provision available in California for a number of years and
used with success, it will be a novel provision for many jurisdictions.
A
major effort will be launched in 1998 and 1999 to adopt the U.C.C.J.E.A. in all
fifty (50) states. As it is
adopted, careful consideration should be given to its impact on the practice in
each state. As it is adopted,
enforcement of custody and visitation orders should become easier state to
state. |
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